William Lewis v. Warden Canaan USP by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-28-2016 
William Lewis v. Warden Canaan USP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"William Lewis v. Warden Canaan USP" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 1040. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/1040 
This October is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
GLD-032        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3011 
___________ 
 
WILLIAM SOLOMON LEWIS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN CANAAN USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. No. 3-14-cv-02325) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 22, 2016 
 
Before:    CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 28, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 William Solomon Lewis, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from an 
                                            
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  His petition sought 
relief from sanctions imposed in prison disciplinary proceedings.  We will summarily 
affirm. 
 According to the incident report, on November 29, 2012, Recreation Specialist 
Anderson ordered Lewis to remove his hat, which he refused to do.  Anderson instructed 
Lewis to report to the lieutenant’s office.  While Lewis was leaving, he stated “you black 
bitch, I don’t have to take shit off!!  It’s always you black bitches trying to run 
something!  You don’t know who I am!  I am a motherfucking white man who can get 
your ass fucked up in this yard, you black bitch!  Black bitches don’t tell me what to do!”   
 On November 30, 2012, Lewis was given advanced written notice that he was 
charged with threatening another with bodily harm in violation of Code 203 and refusing 
an order in violation of Code 307.  During a preliminary investigation, Lewis confirmed 
that he called Anderson a “black bitch” but denied threatening her.  Because of the 
seriousness of the charges, the Unit Discipline Committee referred the charges to a 
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”).  Prior to the hearing, Lewis was informed of his 
rights and he asked to have a staff member represent him and call witnesses.  
 On January 13, 2013, a disciplinary hearing was held.  Lewis did not present any 
documentary evidence.  Lewis asked for several employees to be called as witnesses; 
however, prior to the hearing, each requested employee submitted a statement indicating 
that they either were not present for, or did not observe, the incident.  Lewis’ staff 
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representative told the DHO that he had reviewed the video footage of the incident and it 
did not show if Lewis was talking or not.  Finally, Lewis stated that “the only thing I 
admit to is refusing an order b[y] refusing to take my hat off and calling her a black bitch 
which is insolence.  I made no threats.  I said a total of 9 syllables as I walked out the 
door.  I didn’t say the 65 syllables as she stated.  I was trying to get away from her 
because I know how she is.”    
 The DHO found that the greater weight of the evidence supported a finding that 
Lewis committed the prohibited acts of threatening another with bodily harm and 
refusing to obey an order.  The DHO sanctioned Lewis on the Code 203 violation with a 
disallowance of good conduct time of 27 days, disciplinary segregation of 30 days, loss 
of commissary privileges for 90 days, loss of telephone privileges for 90 days, and an 
impounding of personal property for 30 days.  The DHO sanctioned Lewis on the Code 
307 violation with a loss of commissary privileges for 30 days.  The DHO provided a 
written decision explaining the reasons for the sanctions.  
 After pursuing administrative remedies, Lewis filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his due process rights were violated during 
the disciplinary proceedings.  The District Court denied his petition for habeas corpus.  
Lewis timely appealed.  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Lewis’ procedural due 
process challenge to the disciplinary hearing was properly brought under § 2241 because 
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it entailed the loss of good time credits.1  See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645-46 
(1997).  We review the District Court’s denial of habeas relief de novo and its factual 
findings for clear error.  Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013).   
 A disciplinary hearing that may result in the loss of good time credit must provide 
certain due process safeguards to a prisoner, including:  (1) at least 24-hour advance 
notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary 
evidence; and (3) a written decision explaining the evidence relied upon and the reasons 
for the disciplinary action.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1974).  The 
Supreme Court has held that “revocation of good time does not comport with the 
minimum requirements of procedural due process unless the findings of the prison 
disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 
472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  This standard 
is minimal and “does not require examination of the entire record, independent 
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.”  Id. at 455.  
Rather, the relevant inquiry “is whether there is any evidence in the record that could 
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”  Id. at 455-56. 
                                            
1 It appears that Lewis does not challenge his discipline for the Code 307 violation for 
which he lost 30 days of commissary privileges.  However, even if he were, due process 
rights are only triggered where the prison “imposes atypical and significant hardship on 
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 
523, 531 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).  Here, the 
sanction imposed for the Code 307 violation, a loss of commissary privileges for a short 
period of time, did not meet this standard.  
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 Here, in concluding that Lewis was guilty of threatening another with bodily harm, 
the DHO relied on the incident report, supplemental memorandum, the staff eyewitness 
account, and Lewis’ partial admission that he used a slur.  Accordingly, the decision was 
supported by sufficient evidence to comply with the requirements of due process.2  
Lewis’ remaining claims also lack merit.  He asserted that the DHO should have recused 
herself because she was biased.  This claim of general bias is not sufficient to indicate the 
type of “direct personal or otherwise substantial involvement . . .  in the circumstances 
underlying the charge” that shows the DHO’s impartiality.  Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 
F.2d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1974).   
 Finally, Lewis claims that Code 203 is unconstitutionally vague on its face 
because it places no limits on employee discretion and eliminates any possibility of a 
defense of staff misconduct.3  A regulation is void for vagueness if it (1) “fails to give 
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes,” or (2) is “so standardless that it 
invites arbitrary enforcement.”  Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015) 
(citation omitted); see also Meyers, 492 F.2d at 310 (“we reject the view that the degree 
of specificity required of [prison] regulations is as strict in every instance as that required 
of ordinary criminal sanctions.”).  We are not persuaded that Code 203 is 
                                            
2 Furthermore, we note that the DHO’s decision complied with the requirement that a 
decision must be based on the “greater weight of the evidence” when conflicting 
evidence is presented.  28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f).  The written decision reflects that the 
description of video footage and Lewis’ claim that he did not threaten Anderson was 
considered, but that the DHO found the greater weight of the evidence to indicate that 
Lewis had violated Code 203. 
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unconstitutionally vague.  It is clear what the regulation prohibits, which limits the 
possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory application.  Moreover, 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f) 
places limits on the DHO’s discretion by requiring the decision to be based on some facts 
and, where there is conflicting evidence, on the greater weight of the evidence.   
 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d 
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Code 203 prohibits “threatening another with bodily harm or any other offense.” 
